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Social expectations play a critical role in everyday decision-making. However, their precise neuro-computational role in the
decision process remains unknown. Here we adopt a decision neuroscience framework by combining methods and theories
from psychology, economics and neuroscience to outline a novel, expectation-based, computational model of social preferences.
Results demonstrate that this model outperforms the standard inequity-aversion model in explaining decision behavior in a social
interactive bargaining task. This is supported by fMRI findings showing that the tracking of social expectation violations is
processed by anterior cingulate cortex, extending previous computational conceptualizations of this region to the social domain.
This study demonstrates the usefulness of this interdisciplinary approach in better characterizing the psychological processes
that underlie social interactive decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Behaving socially appropriately routinely requires the ability
to accurately infer what others expect of us. For example,
imagine you are patiently waiting in line and a stranger cuts
in front of you. What are the social norms that inform
behavior in this situation? Perhaps you felt uncomfortable
because this person violated an unspoken rule that everyone
will wait their turn, and contemplated whether or not to
inform them of their transgression. An important, though
understudied, question is how beliefs about social norms
influence these types of everyday social decisions.
To date, there have been several theoretical accounts that
endeavor to explain how we make choices in these social
contexts. One prominent model of social preferences
argues that people value equality and prefer situations
when all participants receive the same amount, even if this
is nothing (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Indeed, a recent study has suggested that brain areas
associated with valuation and reward processing could
underlie this preference (Tricomi et al., 2010).
However, despite its popularity and intuitive appeal, there
is increasing evidence that inequity aversion is not a
complete account of social decision-making. For example,
unfair and unequal offers in a commonly used task examin-
ing social preferences, the Ultimatum Game (UG), will be
accepted if there is evidence that the proposer’s intentions
were ‘noble’ (Falk et al., 2003). In this study, responders were
more likely to accept an unfair $2 offer if they believed this
was chosen over an alternative $0 offer compared to when
they believed the alternative choice was a $5 offer. In add-
ition, responders will still reject unfair offers even when
knowing that this behavior will not impact the proposers
payoff (Yamagishi et al., 2009). In this study, the authors
compared rejection rates to offers in the standard UG to
an impunity game, in which rejecting an offer only affects
the responder’s payoff, not the proposers, which actually
increases the inequity in payoffs between the two players.
An alternative approach to understanding social decision
behavior is to focus on the expectations people have regard-
ing a social interaction. These expectations may reflect a
social norm about what a majority of people would do in
a given situation. Using this framework, we propose that
people develop context-specific expectations of social scen-
arios, which are subsequently used as behavioral reference
points. For example, rejection rates in the UG increase when
participants are provided with information about how other
players have responded (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004), and
decrease when they believe that an unfair offer is ‘typical’
(Sanfey, 2009). These results suggest that expectations about
context appropriate behavior, rather than pure payoff equity
per se, may provide a better account of motivation in
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bargaining behavior. Here, we compared a novel model of
expectations to a prominent inequity aversion model in an
effort to understand the motivations underlying social inter-
active decision-making. In addition, we used this model in
conjunction with fMRI to identify brain networks involved
in the computational process of tracking violations of social
expectations.
METHODS
Participants
Eighteen participants (mean age¼ 19.9, female¼ 56%) were
recruited via advertisements posted on the campus of the
University of Arizona. All participants were screened for
any significant health-related or neuropsychiatric disorders,
and none was currently taking psychoactive medication. One
participant was excluded from the analysis for technical rea-
sons (data not shown). All participants gave informed con-
sent according to procedures approved by the University of
Arizona’s Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
Participants completed two separate sessions. During the
first behavioral session, participants met in small groups
and learned the rules of the UG. Participants then played
in the role of proposer and made offers to 20 other people.
They were informed that these were other participants in the
experiment. Participants then had their picture taken and
were told that other experimental participants would make
proposals to them after viewing their picture, and that they
would decide whether to accept or reject these offers while
being scanned in a subsequent session (Session 2). This
two-stage procedure was designed to increase the plausibility
that participants were interacting with real people. The aver-
age delay between Sessions 1 and 2 was 6.39 days
(s.d.¼ 2.59).
Expectations
Prior to being scanned, we elicited participants’ beliefs about
the kinds of offers they expected to encounter, with partici-
pants being asked the number of people out of 100 that they
believed would make an offer between [0,7] dollars. These
elicited expectations were used to create a distribution of
the frequency of offers that they expected to encounter
(Figure 1A). The weighted mean of this distribution was
used to represent each participant’s initial expectation
(Sanfey, 2009). Formally, the weighted mean x of the set
of offers x¼ [0,7] with the accompanying set of belief
weights b is the quantity
x ¼
Pn
i¼1 bixiPn
i¼1 bi
ð1Þ
where n is the number of offers in x.
Ultimatum game
Participants played a standard single-shot UG in the role of
responder with 48 different proposer partners while under-
going fMRI (Figure 1B). In this game, a proposer is charged
with splitting a sum of money with a partner. The responder
then decides either to accept or reject this proposed offer. If
accepted, the money is split as suggested, but if rejected then
neither player receives anything (Guth et al., 1982).
Twenty-four of the partners used were human, 12 were com-
puters, and 12 were non-intentional humans (i.e. humans
whose responses were randomly generated). Each offer was
preceded by a picture of their partner for that round.
Though participants were told that the human-intentional
offers would be made by other players, in actual fact all offers
were controlled by the experimenter, and all participants saw
the same set of offers. This set consisted of equal numbers
(12 each) of {1,3,5} dollar offers, all of which were
made from a $10 pot. For each participant, partner pictures
were randomly paired to an offer amount, ensuring that
there was no potential picture by offer amount interaction.
Only the human intentional offers were included in the
modeling analyses. Participants were paid $20 for participat-
ing with an additional $5 bonus, which they believed was
based on their performance in the game. While participants
were not specifically queried about the extent to which they
believed they were playing with real people, no participant
questioned the cover story, and our behavioral results are
consistent with studies that did not employ deception
(Camerer, 2003).
Data analyses
All behavioral statistics were computed using the R statis-
tical package (R Development Core Team, 2008). A mixed
logit model (Jaeger, 2008) with the amount of money
offered, and participant’s initial expectation was used to
predict participant’s decisions to accept or reject. We
allowed the slopes for the offer parameter to randomly
vary by subject, but did not estimate a parameter for
the intercept because of the linear dependence on partici-
pant’s expectations.
Modeling
To demonstrate the importance of considering expectations
in the UG, we compared a novel expectation model, which
incorporates expectations to the standard inequity-aversion
model, which posits that people are motivated to minimize
the difference between their payoffs.
Expectation model
The expectation model (Smith, 2009) was developed in the
context of Psychological Game Theory (Geanakoplos et al.,
1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009) which describes a
mathematical framework in which beliefs can be modeled
in the utility function. Similar to other models of emotion
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(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
2007), this model operationalizes anger as a belief dependent
emotion and predicts that people experience anger when
their beliefs about behavioral norms in a given context are
violated. In the UG, offers that are lower than participants’
expectations should bias participants to reject the offer.
Formally, Player 2’s utility U of a given action i can be
defined as
Ui ¼ M2   E2S1  S1ð Þ
þ 10 S1ð Þ
0
where i¼Accept
where i¼Reject

ð2Þ
In this model, Player 2 is interested in both maximizing
the amount of money they will make (M2) and minimizing
their anger, which is defined as the non-negative difference
between the amount of money that they expect Player 1 to
offer (E2S1) and the amount of money that Player 1 actually
offers (S1). The anger term is scaled by a free parameter
which is constrained 0 <  < 1 and is modulated by the size
of the offer.
Inequity-aversion model
This popular model of social preferences (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) predicts that
people value fairness and will be biased to reject offers as
inequity increases (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Tricomi et al.,
2010). Formally, Player 2’s utility for a given action i can be
defined as
Ui ¼ M2  M1 M2ð Þ
þ where i¼Accept
0þ  M1 M2ð Þþ where i¼Reject

ð3Þ
where M1 is the amount of money that Player 1 will
receive and M2 is the amount of money that Player 2
will receive.1 The superscriptþ indicates that these differ-
ences must be non-negative. The inequality term is scaled
by a free parameter which is constrained 0 <  < 1.
Choice rule
The probability P of taking an action i (i.e. accept or reject)
was computed by placing the utility values for each decision
into a softmax function.
Pi ¼ e
Ui
eUaccept þ eUreject ð4Þ
Parameter estimation
Best fitting parameters were derived using the MATLAB
fmincon function (Nelder and Mead, 1965) by maximizing
the log likelihood of the data under each model on a
trial-to-trial basis. Multiple start locations were used to
reduce the likelihood of the optimization algorithm getting
stuck in local minima. LLEs were calculated separately for
each participant as
LLE ¼
X
t
ln Pi,t
  ð5Þ
where i denotes the participant’s choice for a given trial t.
Fig. 1 Ultimatum game. (A) Participant’s expectations about the Ultimatum game. Solid red line reflects average weighted mean. Dotted lines reflect 1 s.d.
(B) A trial timeline. (I) Fixation cross. (II) Picture of their partner for the round. (III) Offer revealed and participant decision (accept or reject offer). (IV) Summary of earnings
for the round.
1It is important to note that because we only have one data point for expectations per participant the two
models could in principle converge on identical predictions regarding the set of offers examined here if an
intercept was included in the inequity aversion model. However, we do not believe there to be a principled
psychological reason to estimate such a parameter in the model, as it would allow for flexibility in the fairness
reference point and extend the model beyond strict inequity. Useful future work could directly manipulate
expectations and/or include offers greater than 50% of the endowment to fully test the divergent predictions
of the two models. Here, we have attempted to limit the potential for over fitting and opted to compare the
purest conceptual implementations of the two models, allowing only one free parameter in each.
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To evaluate the model fits we calculated the Bayesian
Information Criteria (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), which is a
metric of model fit that rewards the most parsimonious
model by adding a penalty for additional free parameters.
BIC ¼ 2  ln L þ k ln nð Þ ð6Þ
where L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for
the model, k is the number of free parameters estimated, and
n is the number of observations.
We also computed a Pseudo R2 measure, which compares
the improvement in LLE gained by the model compared to
a model that chose randomly (i.e. probability¼ 0.5 for each
trial).
PseudoR2 ¼ LLE r
r
ð7Þ
where r is the LLE for the random model.
Model simulation
The behavioral predictions for the models were computed by
using a theta value of 0.3 (the approximate value estimated
in the model fitting procedure) and then calculating the
probability of accepting each offer from the set [0,5] using
equations (2), (3), and (4). For the expectation model,
we varied expectations between [3,5], which was the range
we encountered in our behavioral sample (See Figure 1A).
Neuroimaging analyses
Data acquisition
Each scanning session included a T1-weighted MPRAGE
structural scan (TR¼ 11ms, TE¼ 4ms, matrix¼ 256 X
256, slice thickness¼ 1mm, gap¼ 0mm), followed by five
functional runs. The first three functional runs contained the
UG trials and the last two contained the memory trials (see
(Chang and Sanfey, 2009) for more details about the
memory study). Functional scans used a three-shot multiple
echo planar imaging (MEPI) GRAPPA sequence using par-
ameters selected to maximize signal in regions associated
with high susceptibility artifact, such as orbitofrontal
cortex and medial temporal lobe (Chang et al., 2011)
(TR¼ 2000ms, TE¼ 256ms, matrix¼ 96 X 96,
FOV¼ 192mm, slice thickness¼ 3.0mm, 42 axial slices,
voxel size 2 X 2 X 3).
Data pre-processing
Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed
using the FSL Software package 4.1.4 (FMRIB, Oxford,
UK). The first three volumes of each functional run were
discarded to account for T1 equilibrium effects. Images were
corrected for slice scan time using an ascending interleaved
procedure. Head motion was corrected using MCFLIRT
using a six-parameter rigid-body transformation. Images
were spatially smoothed using a 5-mm full width at half
maximum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter was used to
cut off temporal periods longer than 66 seconds. All images
were initially co-registered to the participant’s high reso-
lution structural scan and were then co-registered to the
MNI 152 person 2-mm template using a 12-parameter
affine transformation. Scanner artifacts, physiological arti-
facts (i.e. cardiac and respiration) and head movement
related artifacts were removed from the data using independ-
ent components analysis (Beckmann and Smith, 2004; Tom
et al., 2007). All functional analyses are overlaid on the
participants’ average high-resolution structural scan in
MNI space.
General analysis methods
A three-level mixed effects general linear model (GLM) was
used to analyze the imaging data. A first-level GLM was
defined for each participant’s functional run that included
a boxcar regressor for each epoch of interest (e.g. decision
phase) convolved with a canonical double-gamma hemo-
dynamic response function (HRF). The duration of epochs
in which participants submitted a response were modeled
using the participant’s reaction time (Grinband et al.,
2008). To account for residual variance, we also included
the temporal derivatives of each regressor of interest, the
six estimated head movement parameters, and any missed
trials (i.e. trials in which participants failed to respond,
n¼ 6) as covariates of no interest. The resulting general
linear model was corrected for temporal autocorrelations
using a first-order autoregressive model. A second-level
fixed effects model was fit for each subject to account for
intra-run variability. For each participant, contrasts were
calculated between parameter estimates for different regres-
sors of interest at every voxel in the brain. A third-level
mixed effects model using FEAT with full Bayesian inference
(Woolrich et al., 2004) was used to summarize group effects
for every specified contrast. Statistical maps were corrected
for multiple comparisons using whole brain cluster correc-
tion based on Gaussian random field theory with an initial
cluster threshold of Z> 2.3 and a Family Wise Error cor-
rected threshold of P< 0.05 (Worsley et al., 1992).
Imaging analysis 1: trial analysis
To examine the neural responses to linear deviations in ex-
pectation violation, we subtracted the amount of money
offered at each trial from the participants’ initial expect-
ations and coded them as 0, 1, 2 or 3þ. Thus, this model
consisted of the four expectation violation predictors, two
additional predictors for the other phases of the task (i.e. face
phase, summary phase and computer and non-intentional
human control trials), a regressor indicating missed trials,
the temporal derivatives of these nine regressors and the six
motion parameters, which resulted in a GLM with a total of
24 predictors. We then used a within subject linear contrast
of the expectation deviations (i.e. 2 1 1 2) to examine the
neural signals that parametrically tracked these deviations.
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Imaging analysis 2: model prediction
While Analysis 1 reveals neural responses associated with
trial-to-trial deviations of expectation, these violations are
necessarily correlated with the amount of money offered
(i.e., smaller offers are always associated with larger expect-
ation violations). To examine the independent effect of ex-
pectations, we restricted our analysis to the intermediate $3
offers and examined neural responses that linearly tracked
with participants’ initial expectations. We selected the $3
offers for this analysis because the model simulation revealed
that these offers should be most susceptible to expectation
effects (Figure 2A). Thus, this model included the following
regressors: face phase, human $1 offers, human $2 offers,
human $3 offers, human $5 offers, non-intentional human
control trials, computer trials, summary phase trials, missing
trials and head motion parameters. Together with the tem-
poral derivatives, this produced a model with a total of 24
regressors. For this analysis, we used a linear contrast of
expectations [i.e. expectations that were between 2.5–3.4
(n¼ 3), 3.5–4.4 (n¼ 11) and 4.5–5.4 (n¼ 3)] to examine
neural responses that linearly tracked with expectations for
the intermediate $3 offers across participants. Importantly,
our randomization procedure ensured that there were no
other systematic differences across the $3 trials such as the
face of the partner, which was confirmed using a Fisher’s
Exact test using Monte Carlo Simulation with 10 000 sam-
ples, P¼ 0.93.
RESULTS
Behavioral
As expected (Sanfey et al., 2003), participants were more
likely to reject offers as they became less equitable (param-
eter estimate¼6.90, s.e.¼ 1.24, odds ratio¼ 0.001,
z¼5.56, P< 0.001). Importantly, however, after control-
ling for offer amount, participants were more likely to
reject offers when they had higher initial expectations, par-
ameter estimate¼ 2.98, s.e.¼ 0.39, odds ratio¼ 19.60,
z¼ 7.71, P< 0.001. These results (Figure 2B), suggest that
participants’ prior beliefs about the social norm are import-
ant in determining whether or not an offer will be accepted.
Modeling
To better understand the computational mechanism
underlying this result, we compared the ability of the two
competing models to explain the behavioral data. The re-
sults, summarized in Table 1, revealed that the expectation
model was a better account of the data than the inequity-
aversion model as evidenced by differences in participants’
BIC scores for each model, t(16)¼2.08, P< 0.05.2
Simulations of the models (Figure 2A) illustrate that they
both make identical predictions when participants believe
that the social norm is $5 (50% of a $10 pot). However,
the models make divergent predictions for behavior as
expectations decrease, with the largest difference being for
the intermediate $3 offers.
Trial analysis
Using a parametric contrast of deviation from expectations
on a trial-by-trial level, we find increasing activity in left
insula, ACC and pre-supplementary motor areas as offers
increasingly violated individual participants’ expectations
(Figure 2C, and Table 2). We did not observe any significant
results associated with positive violations of expectation,
even at a lower threshold (P< 0.005 uncorrected).
Model prediction
We then used the model’s predictions to highlight neural
processes specifically associated with the tracking of expect-
ation violations, which are computationally distinct from
tracking inequity. A whole brain analysis for regions that
linearly track with the model’s predictions for the $3 offers
reveals that only the ACC, SMA and precentral gyrus under-
lies this process (Figure 2D, and Table 2). Participants with
higher expectations demonstrated increased activity in ACC
when deciding about the intermediate $3 offers.
DISCUSSION
In this study we were interested in examining the role of
expectations in social decision-making, and in particular
how social norms impact perceptions of fairness. We used
a simple behavioral economic bargaining game to examine a
financially consequential social decision. Replicating a pre-
vious behavioral study (Sanfey, 2009), responder’s expect-
ations about how they believed proposers would play the
UG appeared to impact their decisions regarding unfair
offers. Specifically, we found that responders who expected
proposers to make lower offers were more likely to accept
these offers. This effect cannot be explained by the popular
notion that people merely prefer to minimize inequity in
payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000). Instead, we find that our formal model of expect-
ations (Smith, 2009) provides a better account of partici-
pants’ behavior than the competing inequity-aversion
model. This suggests that people have context-specific beliefs
about what to expect and are more likely to reject offers that
violate these expectations.
We were further interested in examining the neural sys-
tems that play a computational role in this process.
Violations of expectation at the single trial level were asso-
ciated with the insula, ACC and DLPFC, which is highly
consistent with what has previously been associated with
inequity in previous experiments using the Ultimatum
Game (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Guroglu
et al., 2010; Kirk et al., 2011).3 In fact, because negative ex-
pectation violations were necessarily correlated with inequity
2A significant difference between the two models was also found for the pseudo-r2 measure.
3It is important to note that we also replicate these extant results in the current study using a linear contrast
of inequity at 0.005 uncorrected.
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by our design, it is possible that these results can also be
explained by inequity aversion. However, we were able to
examine processes specific to expectation violations by re-
stricting our analysis to the intermediate $3 offers, which
were demonstrated to be the most susceptible to variations
in individual expectations by our model simulation. A whole
brain search revealed that the ACC was integral in tracking
the predictions of our formal model with participants with
higher expectations demonstrating increased activity in the
ACC when receiving the $3 offers. The ACC has previously
been associated with many other expectation-based effects
such as anticipating aversive events (Ploghaus et al., 1999),
detecting novel events (Downar et al., 2000), placebo effects
(Wager, et al., 2004), weighting social prediction errors
(Behrens et al., 2008) and conforming to others’ expectations
(Klucharev et al., 2009). A previous study found that while
this region was associated with increasingly unfair offers, it
did not underlie decisions to reject (Sanfey et al., 2003). This
Table 1 Modeling results
Model LLE (s.d.) BIC (s.d.) Pseudo-R2 (s.d.) Theta (s.d.)
Anger 3.84 (2.36) 10.86 (4.71) 0.77 (0.14) 0.28 (0.26)
Fehr–Schmidt 4.45 (1.75) 12.07 (3.49) 0.73 (0.11) 0.26 (0.23)
Notes: Values given for the subject average log likelihood estimate (LLE), Bayesian
information criteria (BIC), pseudo-r2 and the estimated theta parameter for each
model.
Fig. 2 Ultimatum game results. (A) Results of the model simulations for ¼ 0.3. Participants are more likely to accept unfair offers as a function of their initial expectations.
(B) Average acceptance rates for each offer amount for varying expectations. Importantly, the acceptance rates closely follow the pattern predicted by the Expectation model.
(C) Neuroimaging results of a linear contrast of deviations from expectation, revealing linearly increasing activity in left anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex and
supplementary motor area. (D) Neuroimaging results for the linear contrast of expectation across subjects for $3 offers. Activity in the ACC/preSMA increases as a function
of expectations. The color bar reflects Z-statistics. Imaging analyses are corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster correction, Z> 2.3, P< 0.05.
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suggests that a neural signal, perhaps akin to a prediction
error signal in basic reinforcement learning (Cavanagh et al.,
2010), may be leveraged to calculate conflict between indi-
vidual preferences and social norms (Klucharev et al., 2009)
and thereby bias decision-making. This interpretation is
highly consistent with a recent proposal that this region is
involved in processing both negative affect and cognitive
control (Shackman et al., 2011).
This result also fits with broader ideas of how expectations
are important in social decision-making. We have previously
demonstrated that people are motivated by guilt to cooper-
ate in order to avoid disappointing a relationship partner’s
expectations, a process mediated by the insula, ACC and
SMA (Chang et al., 2011). In the present study, we find
that people generate a similar neural signal when others vio-
late their expectations, which may serve as an emotional
signal to bias behavior to enforce a social norm. Together,
these two studies demonstrate that a coherent network in the
brain associated with both conflict and emotion underlies
decisions to behave consistently with a social norm. This
provides a plausible unitary neurobiological mechanism to
explain observations that violations of a norm by others
leads to feelings of anger, while violations of the norm by
oneself lead to feelings of guilt (Haidt, 2003; Giner-Sorolla
and Espinosa, 2011).
In summary, these results provide compelling evidence for
the role of expectations in social decision-making behavior.
Our model provides not only a better account of the behav-
ioral data than an inequity aversion model, but reveals that
the process of detecting expectation violations underlying
decisions to reject is associated with the same neural network
that has previously been demonstrated to underlie other,
more basic, expectation-based effects. Overall, these results
demonstrate that people do not use simple heuristics such as
equal splits in considering their responses to financial pro-
posals, but rather rely on their context-specific beliefs about
the social norm to make their decisions.
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